Take Vienna

Seeing as an incredibly strong motivator for why I joined the Army in the first place was because of the (in)actions of the Clinton administration in the face of genocidal tyrants, the situation in Libya makes for an interesting case study in how my perspectives have evolved. Bottom line up front: I think intervention is the wrong move. Mostly because what I've heard proposed are half-measures, attempts to feel good without committing to anything.

The above descriptor notwithstanding, I don't think genocide is occurring. Not to minimize the likely thousands already dead, but violent repression is vastly different than unleashing janjaweed militia, importing machetes, or the systematic annihilation of a minority. As I'll discuss below, there are still parallels to be drawn from the policies of the 1990s, but calling what's happening in Libya genocide is ignorant of both the meaning and history of genocide.

That said, I have serious doubts about the efficacy of a no-fly zone, both as a historical rule and in relation to Libya specifically. A no-fly zone would begin with "acts of war" to suppress Libyan air defenses. Pretending we aren't committed at that point would be an act of willful blindness. Even worse, aside from a generalized outrage, a consistent rationale for why the US would get involved hasn't been articulated. Would we be fighting for democracy, even though we don't actually know if that's a rebel goal? Are we fighting to depose a "delegitimzed" Qaddafi, in which case why stop at cratering airfields? Are we supporting the rebels? Does that mean coordinated tactical strikes to aid operations? Or just striking at anything shooting at the rebels, like planes and helicopters? What about tanks or troops? Or is this a symbolic gesture? If so, is an act of war really the appropriate medium to say "yep, I've still got my mojo", especially if we then fail to follow through?

But this strategic ambiguity also means no one else knows what we're doing either. If we're actively supporting rebel elements against dictators, what message to we send to allies like Saudi Arabia? How do we avoid looking hypocritical when China suppresses it's own activists, or justify our support for Malaki or Karzai, given their lack of popular support, without looking crassly self-interested? Likewise, what happens if we support the rebels and they prove too unorganized or underequipped to finish the fight on their own steam? Do we start another 12-year no-fly zone and tolerate the continuation of the regime, or do we move in ground forces of our own?

If our goal is unambiguously to depose Qaddafi, I think it might be possible to thread the Pottery Barn needle, even if that involves ground troops, be it the 101st or special operations forces. But if we're unclear as to our purpose, end state, or willingness to complete the job, we're better off steering clear. A no-fly zone, multilateral or not, isn't capable producing results. It'll look showy, and it'll feel good in DC, but it carries risk and investments out of proportion to our articulated principles, desired end states, or willpower.