Who are we?

 On the one hand, it's gratifying to hear that the US is handing off command and that we are only involved in 2.5 wars. It ostensibly limits our involvement, our financial obligations, and in theory precludes putting troops on the ground. The ambiguity of the end state still allows for the potential that things will change and that nothing goes according to plan. We're still on the hook for the conduct of both our allies and our ostensible supportees. Nevertheless, it's an intriguing decision.

But it puts the US in a weird position. While Libya does possess oil, it's hardly a significant amount, especially when compared to the rest of the Arab world. Basically, the is unambiguously a humanitarian intervention. No one can really identify a compelling national interest for any of the countries involved. If anything, the more consistent explanation seems to be the domestic politics of the assembled countries. So, absent the crass motivations that mire discussion of Iraq or Afghanistan, Libya seems to be a case of clear humanitarian motivations. It's about as close as the international community gets to "doing the right thing".

And yet the US is sitting this one out. Our image has been badly tarnished after Iraq, and the predominant narrative seems to be that the US only goes to war if our national interests, which is to say oil conglomerates, are involved. Even though we've launched air strikes and Tomahawks, we're passing control, and credit to other countries. There's some practical sense to this, yet that sense is going untaughted. So, we're getting involved in a moral cause, for good reasons, let letting others take the credit and allowing our reputation as opportunistic, oil-hungry oil mongers to go challenged. For that, we might as well have just let the Europeans handle it and saved our missiles for our own ends.

But there's also the Obama history of being much better at doing things than at selling their ability to do things. From health care to DADT, the administration has had a surprising record of quietly focusing on their goals. As their projects have all been long-term investments that will take years to develop, the results don't even speak for themselves. Coupled with weird issues staying on message, I'm curious to hear how this will play out come election year. I'm still not sure if this represents the triumph of policy over posturing, or just simple confusion about what the message is to begin with, but all in all, it makes for an odd Presidency, one that seems to avoid the spotlight.

The myth of NGO neutrality

In a counterinsurgency, there is no such thing as a neutral party. There may be unaffiliated parties, parties who refuse to endorse either the government or the rebels. But when the center of gravity are the loyalties of the population, the conditions of their lives contextualizes how they interact with either belligerent force. A poor village, desperate for a market for their milk, finds fast friends in an insurgent who needs food. A village in the midst of a water dispute with a neighboring town sides with those willing to arbitrate the case. A young man, whose family is fed by international aid, can join the local police instead of working the field. Aid isn't neutral. It makes a village strong enough to resist insurgent incursions. An insurgency isn't fought between armies, with tragic casualties of innocent bystanders, non-belligerents. It's fought by the people, for the people, and of the people. There is no neutral space, only unaffiliated, whether through choice or weariness or cagey caution. When making people's lives better, showing them their lives will be better off under the government, aid isn't neutral.

Likewise, when aid is given in areas controlled by insurgents, it aids their cause. It lets them gain medical training, like the ICRC training given to Taliban medics last year. Foodstuffs are diverted for insurgent use, while development projects are co-opted to steal credit and show that life is better under insurgent care. But ultimately, humanitarian aid, provided without consideration of political affiliation, lets the insurgent run the political show and eases the strains of the community, strengthening their political rule. Because the sustainment of the community is exogenous, the insurgents gets both credit for supervising an area with a decent quality of life and control through permitting or denying the aid. So while the aid worker may be supplying the basic humanitarian supplies to a badly impoverished, war-stricken village, they're functionally supporting a side.

Lastly, in the cases of an insurgency like the Taliban, whose first attempt to governance involved lighting people on fire in public arenas, ignoring the character of the sides involved may end producing more harm and dependency for the very people an agency is trying to help. While an insurgency is never clean on either side; there is not a moral equivalency. Differences can be discerned, even between shades of gray. International aid neutrality may have been appropriate in an era when wars were fought between states, with clearly demarcated rules and codes of conduct and ways to discriminate between the combatants and the civilian. But that era has passed, and the international aid community needs to adjust to reflect that.

Take Vienna

Seeing as an incredibly strong motivator for why I joined the Army in the first place was because of the (in)actions of the Clinton administration in the face of genocidal tyrants, the situation in Libya makes for an interesting case study in how my perspectives have evolved. Bottom line up front: I think intervention is the wrong move. Mostly because what I've heard proposed are half-measures, attempts to feel good without committing to anything.

The above descriptor notwithstanding, I don't think genocide is occurring. Not to minimize the likely thousands already dead, but violent repression is vastly different than unleashing janjaweed militia, importing machetes, or the systematic annihilation of a minority. As I'll discuss below, there are still parallels to be drawn from the policies of the 1990s, but calling what's happening in Libya genocide is ignorant of both the meaning and history of genocide.

That said, I have serious doubts about the efficacy of a no-fly zone, both as a historical rule and in relation to Libya specifically. A no-fly zone would begin with "acts of war" to suppress Libyan air defenses. Pretending we aren't committed at that point would be an act of willful blindness. Even worse, aside from a generalized outrage, a consistent rationale for why the US would get involved hasn't been articulated. Would we be fighting for democracy, even though we don't actually know if that's a rebel goal? Are we fighting to depose a "delegitimzed" Qaddafi, in which case why stop at cratering airfields? Are we supporting the rebels? Does that mean coordinated tactical strikes to aid operations? Or just striking at anything shooting at the rebels, like planes and helicopters? What about tanks or troops? Or is this a symbolic gesture? If so, is an act of war really the appropriate medium to say "yep, I've still got my mojo", especially if we then fail to follow through?

But this strategic ambiguity also means no one else knows what we're doing either. If we're actively supporting rebel elements against dictators, what message to we send to allies like Saudi Arabia? How do we avoid looking hypocritical when China suppresses it's own activists, or justify our support for Malaki or Karzai, given their lack of popular support, without looking crassly self-interested? Likewise, what happens if we support the rebels and they prove too unorganized or underequipped to finish the fight on their own steam? Do we start another 12-year no-fly zone and tolerate the continuation of the regime, or do we move in ground forces of our own?

If our goal is unambiguously to depose Qaddafi, I think it might be possible to thread the Pottery Barn needle, even if that involves ground troops, be it the 101st or special operations forces. But if we're unclear as to our purpose, end state, or willingness to complete the job, we're better off steering clear. A no-fly zone, multilateral or not, isn't capable producing results. It'll look showy, and it'll feel good in DC, but it carries risk and investments out of proportion to our articulated principles, desired end states, or willpower.