Af/Pak Aggregation (pt. 1)

Still a week later and louder echo chamber, I still haven't come to a firm thought on Af/Pak. But I figured I'd try to lay things out publically as best I understood them, in the hope someone might correct my misunderstandings. Bear with the oversimplifications, I'm brain dumping impressions. This post is just trying to set the stage for all the relevant actors. I anticipate part 2 to be 2000-2008, and part 3 to be 2009 and "where do we go from here?".

So, back in the 80s, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. We didn't like that, so we gave the mujaheddin missiles, weapons, and money. The Pakistanis like this idea, insist on making the ISI the middleman, steal quite a bit of the money, tech, and weaponry being channeled through their country, and cultivate serious back-channels with everyone. Pakistan figures Afghanistan is a great chance to (a) endear itself to the US, as Soviet patronage was lacking, and in marked contrast to Indian "third way neutrality", (b) cultivate a power vacuum as a strategic buffer zone, hedging against countries like Iran, and (c) train fighters for fighters against the Indians. Then the Soviets beat feet, we decided they were on to something, and followed form. As far as I know, the Afghani didn't expect us to help pick up the pieces (or mines), and we left on fairly unhostile terms with those whom we had been interacting. Nevertheless, Afghanistan had nothing that resembled a strong central government, even if it was recognized internationally. It also has nothing that resembles infrastructure, an education system, or a potential for an economy. Subsistence life and vast tracts of open space were about all the country had to offer.

Around 1993, Mullah Omar figures this is an awesome time to unleash the Prophet upon the country, solicits a bunch of extremely unhappy young men, tells them women suck, technology is worse, and unkempt facial hair is the new black. Afghanistan envies the Dark Ages for its wise learnings, religious toleration, and enlightened attitudes towards things like exposed ankles. Around the same time the Sopranos reaches mainstream American acclaim, the residents of Kabul gather in stadiums to watch public disfigurement and execution doxied up as sharia justice. Pakistan is one of only three countries to grant diplomatic recognition to the Taliban, and deepens it's ties. Kashmir ignites, and nuclear war suddenly seems possible.

Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden wanders adrift after the Soviets left Afghanistan. He spends a few years wandering around, but as he grows both more radical and more vocal about continued US presence in Saudi Arabia post-Gulf War, he's blacklisted in the kingdom, and is forced to relocate to Sudan (1992). America becomes his fixation, the chief obstacle in reestablishing a pan-Islamic caliphate. By 1993, he's reorganized sufficiently to provide training to Somali militias in their use of rocket-propelled grenades and the development of alterations to the RPGs that drastically altered the tactics used by Aidid's militias. 18 Rangers and Delta operators died. Bin Laden cites Somalia as his proof that America was a paper tiger. Bombings in Khobar Towers, Kenya, Nairobi, and the USS Cole follow in the years after. Al Qaeda relocates to Afghanistan after diplomatic pressure on Khartoum, where it strikes up a symbiotic, if nervous relationship with the Taliban. The Taliban provides cover, territory, and men, and AQ provides training and enhanced prestige.

The United States begin to cultivate a counterterrorism strategy and capability. As recently as 1980, American counterterrorist deficiencies had come to a public, tragic, and embarrassing head at Desert One. By the mid-1990s, Clinton became concerned enough to create a terrorism czar to oversee interagency intelligence and coordination. Even so, the post was more of an analyst/manger position, and US policy never coalesced. It took the above bombings to convince the State Department to harden buildings overseas, and 9/11 was enabled by pilots being trained to cooperate and land the plane ASAP. Retaliation for the bombings ended up putting eggs on the face of the Clinton administration, as the "chemical weapons" plant in Sudan proved to be a factory for anti-malarials, and using million dollar Tomahawks to blow away some empty canvas tents. We say "proportional retaliation", bin Laden says "further proof the US lacks guts, plus, they missed me, so they're incompetent too".

Lastly, to bring the millennium to a close, the US has engaged in a series of failed/failing nation building exercises and now thoroughly loves air power as the panacea to cure all national security ills (also, commandos are sexy). Technology is ascendant in prognosticating the future battlespace. Air power won in 1991, and it "won" in 1999 in Kosovo (never mind the KLA or a potential invasion). Somalia was a mistake in the first place, and Rwanda not worth the bones of even one Pomeranian grenadier. But "never again" was Clinton's vow, and damned if Bush wasn't going to repudiate everything Clinton. As far as the campaigns were concerned: nation building was out, a hyper-streamlined military was in, terrorism unimportant, and national security strategy mirrored New Orleans at Mardi Gras: laissez les bon temps roulez.

Thoughts on Af/Pak

As glad I am to see serious ink spilt on American purpose in Af/Pak, I'm both a little torn on my own position and a little surprised at the ambivalence expressed. Had you asked me even two months ago to characterize opinion on the US policy towards Afghanistan, I would have said both the commentariat and the vox populi were glad and supportive that attention, priorities, and resources had been shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. For the right, it meant they didn't have to talk about Iraq any more and could start hopping on pop over health care. For the left, it was a vindication that we were finally paying attention to the "right war". So, I've been rather confused where all this sudden ambivalence and hesitation has come from.

To be sure, the Administration hasn't done itself any favors by being so mute in describing its goals. They let the news stories guide the discussion, so I suppose I shouldn't be so shocked when the narrative of any length out of Af/Pak have been drone strikes kill people good, and Joes are dying. Without any effort, the antiwar effort has their message constructed for them, the moderates are able to grasp at that godawful placebo of a straw that is the strategic air power fallacy, and the right can say "we gotta make those sacrifices worth it" (paraphrase). Leave it to people to connect the dots on their own and don't be surprised when they're doodling all over the map because you couldn't tell them there was a dragon underneath all that.

I'm still digesting the cacophony, but my general thoughts are: (1) we broke it, so we bought it; (2) drone strikes alone are an awful idea; (2.5) supporting drone strikes alone is either an inadequate read of history or just simple grasping at straws (see fallacies 3 and 7); (3) counterterrorism alone as a policy will only breed new terrorists, even if they are based in Pakistan instead of Afghanistan, and even as a managed chronic illness, that just begs for another black swan; (4) screw Al Qaeda, they're a legitimate threat, but not our "mortal enemy" (even we are theirs); (5) we need to massively increase our funding of development assistance; (5.5) and they need to be something more intelligent than: "here's a soccer ball, vote American"; (6) we can't support a corrupt government and hope to win; and (7) when you have the Taliban spraying acid in girl's faces just for trying to go to school, saying "reduce our troop footprint, but throw more money at education and agriculture" is going to us look ineffectual when we can't deliver (or complicitly corrupt), impotent when we can't defend it or the aid workers, feckless as a general rule and will only get Afghans killed (Kristoff and the NGOs, I'm looking at you).