Monday, August 24, 2009

This is my soap box. There are many like it, but this one is mine.

The increasing calls for significant reevaluation of America's Af/Pak policy has revealed some odd actors. The trope between "wars of necessity" and "wars of choice" has shown up recently in a number of critiques of American involvement in Afghanistan, arguing that American involvement is now a function of inertia rather than wise policy. Oddly, the most vocal voices of such critiques seem to be the same people who were saying a few years back that we should be in Afghanistan instead of Iraq, citing (a) that was where the terrorists were actually based that attacked us, and (b) "we broke it, we bought it".

Yet now, as Iraq appears to be winding down (or, at least, our attention directed elsewhere), and our gaze turns to Afghanistan, these critics aren't changing their argument, even as they get what they asked for. Specific policy critiques of prior Afghanistan policy often cited Afghanistan's far larger land mass, higher overall population, and lower population density all as reasons why the troops we had in Iraq were needed in Afghanistan. In the interim between then (say, 2004 or 2007) and now, Afghanistan didn't change much, as near as I can tell. It's only been in the last 9 months or so, that Afghanistan has gotten appreciably more dangerous. Furthermore, all indicators are that the shifts in strategy, be it in the Pentagon, the White House, or by the theater commander, are all direct reactions to a war that has ground on for years without resolution. The changes in force allocations, political capitol, and strategy are all in line with what a lot of critics of Bush-era policy sought. Yet they remain critics.

Now, the easy, pithy reply is to say that their role is that of critic first, scion of national policy second. The left finds its comfort zone in opposition, a desirable quality when in genuine opposition, less desirable when your party is in power. Critical theory, political marginalization, and I suspect a decent dose of contrarianism combine to make criticism feel more natural than support or involvement, and criticism is best done outside the government, from think-tanks, academia, and public organization. Of course, the left is far from along in having a long roster of prominent individuals more comfortable outside looking in, but I gig the left explicitly here because it is my general impression that the criticism and impatience towards Obama's policies is most coming from the left, from the very people whose commentary years ago is being realized.

Which brings up the question of dissent. Dissent is of unquestionable utility, and without dissent, changes like Petraeus or the Surge would not have been possible. Groups like MoveOn.org and Code Pink, have never been less than absolutely upfront about their opposition to any and all war, regardless of reason. Regardless of your agreement with their position, their opposition to Afghanistan creates no cognitive dissonance. But for the rest of the party, and for the moderates who clamored for a refocus on Afghanistan during the dark years on grounds anywhere from moral imperatives, strategic necessity or simple retributive justice, such opposition is troubling. It suggests either that these critics still haven't adjusted to being power and are still more comfortable on their soap box than in active support, or that these critics are closeted Code Pink, which is fairly disingenuous, and a hindrance to further debate on the merits of policy if one can't be sure who they represent.

And, at this stage, full-throated debate is needed. Some things are starting to change, but demanding a coherent articulation of the Administration's goals and objectives is eminently reasonable. AM's notation that career public servants are asking the same question as politicians should rightly serve as a warning bell that even the people charged with implementing the policy aren't sure how or why they are performing their jobs. Acting the loyal opposition because your habit is first to criticize, then solve, undercuts whatever effort goes forth because the criticism won't stop once the ship changes direction. But acting the opposition because you sense a void could be filled with your questions gives voice to the questions others didn't know they wanted to ask, and provides direction, guidance, and metrics to progress. Know your motives.

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Resist the consilience

One of my favorite blogs this past year, Abu Muqawama, has recently started a series of guest posts debating the question "what are the strategic goals of the United States in Afghanistan"? An eminently worthy topic, and one that I agree has gotten short shrift. Yet this has been a blog that has conscientiously limited itself to tactical and operational questions, and has started to receive fire for allegedly dodging bigger issues. In answering tactical and opertational questions, he has done so sufficiently well to garner both employment, public citation, and professional consultation. So, can he limit himself to answering the question of how counterinsurgency can (should?) be waged without answering the question of whether it should. Specifically, without answering whether we should be in Iraq or Afghanistan while saying how we should be fighting?

Similarly, a movie I saw recently, The Hurt Locker, has received loving critical acclaim (deservedly so), yet it's most commonly cited fault is not with it's story telling, it's narration, characters, direction, or editing. It isn't poor plot or shabby writing. It is that it doesn't say anything "larger" about the war in Iraq. It isn't a movie about Iraq, played out by representative characters operating in a hostile, alientating environment, subject to forces outside their control. It isn't a metaphor for the war, or a microcosm thereof. It is a movie about characters, people at their elemental. To be fair, these criticisms haven't been been particularly prolific or vehement, so my issue is more with the need to say anything at all than with it's volume.

In both cases, contributions could be made by both to the greater dialogue, to add their voices to the tintinabulation of the vox populi. But by constraining their scope, they maintain both a purity and a humility not found in grander works. I have no idea what their motivations were for such restraint, but in an era where everyone feels qualified to offer opinions on almost any subject by merit of having an opinion, I find it refreshing. And when they do finally make comments or allusions, they are all the more salient for their silence.